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CASE COMMENTS
A possible solution to this vexing question might be to allow
the lessor the interest on the royalties in addition to the royalties
themselves. If both were given as damages the lessor would still
retain the interest in the event the lessee would take advantage of
the offset provision.
Eugene Triplett Hague, Jr.
Procedure-The Sufficiency of the Record in Opposing a
Motion for Summary Judgment
The government brought a civil antitrust suit against D, a truck
manufacturer. The principal practices charged as violations of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, 3 (1958), were limitations on the ter-
ritories within which distributors could sell and limitations on the
persons or classes of persons to whom they could sell. The govern-
ment moved for summary judgment and filed depositions and ex-
hibits in support of its motion. D filed a brief in opposition and al-
leged therein that the limitations were fair and reasonable and did
not violate the Sherman Act. D filed no affidavits, depositions, or
other evidence showing facts on which its allegations were based.
The district court granted the motion. D appealed. Held, reversed.
D made allegations concerning factual matters which were relevant
to a decision on the merits. More economic and business data from
which such limitations emerged must be shown before the court
could determine whether the arrangement stifled competition or
had any redeeming virtue. A dissenting opinion held that on the
facts presented there was no genuine issue of fact and the moving
party was entitled to a summary judgment. White Motor Co. v.
United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 696 (1963).
"While it is true that every simile limps, the motion for summary
judgment is not unlike the unveiling of a statute. The motion re-
quires the opposition to remove the shielding cloak of formal
allegations and demonstrate a genuine issue as to a material fact."
United States v. Dollar, 100 F. Supp. 881, 884 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
This statement succinctly states the real purpose of summary judg-
ment procedure under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. Rule 56(c), 28 U.S.C. 5177 (1958), provides, inter alia, that
a summary judgment shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
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that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Such a
judgment, if granted, operates as a final disposition of the case.
Carwile v. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 196 Va. 1, 82 S.E.2d 588
(1954).
Summary judgment procedure was devised for promptly dis-
posing of actions in which there was no genuine issue as to any
material fact. In many cases no genuine issue of material fact
exists, although such an issue was raised by the formal pleadings.
6 MooRE's FEDERAL PAcncE j[ 56.04(1) (2d Ed. 1953). As such,
Rule 56 was designed for a state of the proceeding where there were
apparent issues of fact raised by the pleadings. United States v.
Daubendiek, 25 F.R.D. 50 (N.D. Iowa 1959). It was intended to
permit a party to pierce the allegations of fact in the pleadings and
to obtain relief where facts set forth in detail in affidavits, de-
positions, and admissions on file show that there were no genuine
issues of fact to be tried. Engle v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.2d
469 (2d Cir. 1943).
The Court in the principal case apparently overlooked the real
purpose of summary judgment procedure. It reversed the lower
court's decision granting a summary judgment on mere allegations
of fact in D's brief opposing the motion. Several cases have held that
mere paper denials and formal allegations of fact are insufficient
to create a geninue issue of fact unless evidence is submitted in sup-
port of them. Lawhorn v. Atlantic Refining Co., 299 F.2d 353 (5th
Cir. 1962); Koepke v. Fontenchio, 177 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1949);
Christianson v. Gaines, 174 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1949). A motion for
summary judgment should not be denied merely because the
opposing party may be able to prove, on trial, facts or conclusions
alleged, but the opposing party must come forward with evidence at
the time the motion is made which shows an issue of a material
fact. Cockrell v. Mechling Barge Lines, Inc., 192 F. Supp. (S.D.
Tex. 1961).
Perhaps the underlying reason for reversing the lower court in
the principal case was the nature of the case involved. Where
issues of public moment are involved the practice has tended away
from procedure based on affidavits and interrogatories. Kennedy v.
Silas Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249 (1948); Eccles v. People's Bank, 333
U.S. 426 (1948). The Court in the instant case apparently adopted
the view of Mr. Justice Murphy's dissenting opinion in Associated
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Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 52 (1945). Clear and unmis-
takable proof is necessary in any Sherman Act violation, especially
where a summary judgment is involved. This same general view
is adopted in Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368
U.S. 464 (1962). The Court has also held that vertical expansion
such as that in the principal case was not a per se violation of the
Sherman Act, but depends upon the motives and intent of the
parties and its effect upon the market. United States v. Columbia
Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 525 (1948); United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 173 (1948).
Mr. Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poller v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc., supra, and Mr. Justice Clark's dissenting
opinion in the principal case take the position that Rule 56 does not
indicate that it is to be used any more "sparingly" in antitrust
litigation than in other types of civil cases. To disagree with their
position would be to refute the purpose of Rule 56. Once the moving
party for summary judgment has introduced evidence which clearly
shows that a genuine issue of fact does not exist, the opposing party
must meet the movant's evidence with a showing of facts, in detail
and with precision, sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material
fact. A formal denial of the movanes evidence or general allegations
by the opposing party in a brief, without facts presented to support
them, should not prevent the awarding of a summary judgment.
United States v. Daubendiek, supra. The opposing party to a
motion for summary judgment in an antitrust suit should be re-
quired to show evidence of a genuine issue of fact as in other civil
actions to keep within the purpose of the rule.
Since the principal case was decided, Rule 56 has been
amended. The amendment to subsection (e) makes it clear that
pleading allegations cannot, in themselves, create a genuine issue
of fact when summary judgment is sought. 31 F.D.R. Adopted
Amendments, No. 4 p. 17 (January, 1963). The Court intimates in
the instant case that a contrary decision would have been reached
if the amendment had been effective when the motion for summary
judgment was made.
Rule 56 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure is the
same as the Federal Rule prior to its amendment. W. Va. R.C.P.
56. In the only case decided in this state since the adoption of the
Rules in which a summary judgment was involved, the court indi-
cated it will give a literal interpretation to Rule 56. In Petros v.
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Kellas, 122 S.E.2d 177 (W. Va. 1960), the court stated that, to resist
a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must present
some evidence to indicate that the facts are in dispute and that the
mere contention that the issue is disputable is not sufficient.
Although Federal Rule 56 applies to all civil cases, the courts
have been reluctant to use summary judgment procedure in many
instances, particularly where an issue of public moment was in-
volved. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., supra; Ken-
nedy v. Silas Mason Co., supra; Pacific American Fisheries v. Mul-
laney, 191 F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1951). These decisions stem from
the reluctance of the judiciary to get away from the open court and
the fact that the credibility of witnesses cannot be effectively
examined by affidavits and depositions. Sartor v. Arkansas Gas
Corp., 321 U.S. 620 (1944); Note, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 212 (1950-51).
The amendment to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules has apparently
eliminated the problem. Such an amendment would not appear
necessary in West Virginia as the court has indicated it will require
the opposing party to present facts to oppose the motion for sum-
mary judgment and mere allegations would be insufficient. To
hold otherwise would be to avoid the primary purpose of the rule.
Sterl Franklin Shinaberry
Sales-Persons Protected by Warranties Under the Uniform
Commercial Code--Employee of Buyer Held Not Protected
P, a bartender of a fraternal lodge, was injured by flying glass
when an unopened bottle of carbonated soda water exploded as it
was standing behind the bar. The soda was bottled, sold and
delivered by D to P's employer. P sued for breach of implied war-
ranties of fitness and merchantability. The trial court sustained D's
demurrer to the complaint. Held, affirmed. The manufacturer's
implied warranties of fitness and merchantability does not extend to
an employee of the purchaser under UNooIm CoM!mCIAL CoD, §
2-318. Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 187 A.2d 575 (Pa. 1963).
The decision of the instant case may have great impact in West
Virginia, due to the West Virginia Legislature's recent passage of
the Uniform Commercial Code. The issue now is, will the West
Virginia Court extend warranties to third party beneficiaries beyond
the provisions of the Code?
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